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In the context of a simple model of public good provision, we study the
requirement on an allocation rule that it be immune to manipulation by
augmenting one’s endowment through borrowing from the outside world. We
call it open-economy borrowing-proofness (Thomson, 2009). We ask whether
the Lindahl rule satisﬁes the property. The answer is yes on both the do-
main of quasi-linear economies and on the domain of homothetic economies.
However, on the classical domain (when preferences are only required to be
continuous, monotone, and convex), the answer is negative. We compare the
manipulability of the rule through borrowing and its manipulability through
withholding. We also asks whether the rule is immune to manipulation by
borrowing from a fellow trader, closed-economy borrowing-proofness. We
obtain a parallel set of answers. The negative results hold no matter how
small the amount borrowed is constrained to be.
Key-words: Public good; Lindahl rule; Kolm triangle; borrowing-proofness;
withholding-proofness.
11 Introduction
Allocation rules can be manipulated in a variety of ways. Agents may mis-
represent their preferences, a possibility that has been extensively studied.
They can also take advantage of the control they have over resources, and
diﬀerent kinds of stratagems of this type have been identiﬁed. For instance,
in a classical exchange economy in which resources are allocated by means
of the Walrasian rule, an agent may beneﬁt from withholding some of his
endowment. He may even beneﬁt from destroying some of it. Also, he may
beneﬁt from transferring some of his endowment to someone else, (of course
without this second agent being hurt, thereby having no reason not to accept
the transfer). For a discussion of these phenomena, see Gale (1974), Aumann
and Peleg (1974), Postlewaite (1979), and Thomson (1987a,b). Additional
manipulation opportunities are discussed in Thomson (2007).
We consider here the following form of manipulation. Suppose that prior
to the operation of the chosen rule, an agent borrows resources so as to aug-
ment his endowment. The rule is then applied; he receives the consumption
bundle the rule assigns to him, and he returns what he had borrowed. In the
end, he may be better oﬀ than if he had not borrowed. Our objective is to
study the requirement on a rule that it not be subject to this kind of manip-
ulation. We call it “borrowing-proofness”. The requirement is formulated
and studied in the context of classical economies by Thomson (2009).
We have in mind two possible scenarios. First, an agent may have access
to resources outside of the group of agents with whom he normally trades.
There is a growing literature concerning situations of this kind, when an
agent may exploit the particular place he holds in the social network. Here,
we imagine that an agent who is part of some community is also involved with
another community where he can borrow resources. This other community
is not explicitly modeled. We then have an “open-economy” model, and we
refer to the property of immunity to manipulation through borrowing from
the outside world as “open-economy borrowing-proofness”. Alternatively,
the agent could simply exaggerate the resources he owns, without the social
planner being able to verify these claims of ownership. This virtual augmen-
tation is mathematically equivalent to actual borrowing from the outside,
but for simplicity we will mainly refer to one story, the borrowing story.
The second scenario pertains to situations in which an agent borrows from
one of his fellow traders. He should of course provide the lender the incentive
to do so: after the borrower has returned what he borrowed, the lender should
1be at least as well oﬀ as he would have been if he had not lent. We now
have a “closed-economy” model and we refer to the property of immunity to
borrowing from within as “closed-economy borrowing-proofness”.
The resource allocation problem we consider is standard: there are two
goods, one private good and one public good; the private good can be either
consumed as such, or it can be used as input in the production of the public
good. At what level should the public good be produced, and how much
should each agent contribute to its production? These are the questions
addressed in the literature on public good provision.
We investigate the manipulability through borrowing of a rule that is
central to this literature, the “Lindahl rule” (Lindahl, 1919). Character-
izing the equilibria of manipulation games associated with this rule when
agents can either withhold part of their endowments or exaggerate them is
the object of Thomson (1979) and Sertel and Sanver (1999). We study the
borrowing-proofness of the Lindahl rule on three standard preference do-
mains, when only the “classical” assumptions of continuity, monotonicity,
and convexity of preferences are made, and when in addition, preferences
are either quasi-linear or homothetic. (We add assumptions that guarantee
its single-valuedness.) We show that on both the quasi-linear and the ho-
mothetic domains, the Lindahl rule is borrowing-proof under either scenario
(Propositions 1 and 2 and Propositions 3 and 4). In fact, as long as the pub-
lic good is a normal good, this conclusion holds. However, on the classical
domain, it does not (Examples 1 and 4).
It is interesting to relate open-economy borrowing-proofness to the re-
quirement of immunity to manipulation through withholding of some of one’s
endowment, called “withholding-proofness” (Postlewaite, 1979, introduces
this property for private good economies). It is known that the Lindahl rule
is not withholding-proof on the classical domain (Thomson, 1979, 1987b). We
show that this negative result also holds on either the quasi-linear domain
or the homothetic domain (Examples 2 and 3). Altogether then, manip-
ulation through open-economy borrowing should be less of a concern than
manipulation through withholding.
Another reason why it should be less of a concern is of course that bor-
rowing requires an agent to have access to external resources under the ﬁrst
scenario, and to convince one of his fellow traders to go along with his scheme
under the second scenario. By contrast, withholding can be carried out en-
tirely on one’s own. When manipulation is interpreted as exaggeration, ask-
ing agents to provide proof of ownership is a practical way to deal with the
2behavior.
Yet, for our negative results, we place a bound on the amount borrowed,
and in fact, we prove stronger claims: no matter how small that bound is,
borrowing-proofness fails.
Why should we worry about agents manipulating through borrowing?
For the same reason we should worry about them manipulating by misrep-
resenting their preferences, or by transferring their endowments among one
another, or by withholding or destroying part of their endowments. An allo-
cation rule is chosen because of the properties it enjoys. If an agent does not
behave as speciﬁed by the rule, the allocations the rule is supposed to reach
are less likely to be reached. In most cases, the ﬁrst consequence of manip-
ulation, be it misrepresentation of preferences or endowment manipulation
in any of its forms, is that a rule designed to produce eﬃcient allocations
will be prevented from doing so. Also, a rule is usually speciﬁed so as to
satisfy some distributional or participation requirements. These too may not
be satisﬁed if agents manipulate.
Ours is not an intertemporal model of a monetary economy. Borrowing
ﬁnancial resources is of course a very convenient means of achieving intertem-
poral eﬃciency and there is no reason to object to it in that context.1
To establish most of our results, we use the so-called Kolm triangle, the
very ingenious geometric representation of public good economies with two
agents, two goods, one private good and one public good, and a linear tech-
nology, developed by Kolm (1971). Throughout this exposition we adopt the
didactic style that this device makes possible.2
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model.
In Section 3, we deﬁne and discuss the open-economy version of borrowing-
proofness. In Section 4, we study the manipulability of the Lindahl rule
through withholding and provide some insight into the reasons why it is
more vulnerable to this sort of behavior than to manipulation through open-
economy borrowing. In Section 5, we consider the closed-economy version
of borrowing-proofness. In Section 6, we oﬀer concluding comments and list
1Unfortunately, in describing the phenomenon in which we are interested, we could not
ﬁnd a term that would not bring to mind allocation over time.
2Other geometric representations have been proposed. The Dolbear (1967) triangle
allows one to keep standard rectangular axes for one of the agents but not for both. Thus, it
breaks the symmetry between them. The Kolm triangle has the advantage of treating both
agents symmetrically. The representation used by Sertel (1994) uses standard rectangular
axes for both agents, but a feasible allocation is mapped into two points in R2
+.
3open questions.
2 Notation and denitions
There are two goods, one private good and one public good, and n 2 N
agents. Let N  f1,...,ng be the set of agents. Each agent i 2 N is
equipped with a preference relation deﬁned on R2
+, denoted by Ri. Let Pi
denote the strict preference relation associated with Ri and Ii the corre-
sponding indiﬀerence relation. Let R  (R1,...,Rn) denote the proﬁle of
preferences. Each agent i 2 N is endowed with an amount ωix  0 of the
private good. Let ωx  (ω1x,...,ωnx) 2 RN
+ denote the proﬁle of these en-
dowments.3 The private good can be consumed as such or it can be used
in the production of the public good. Initially, there is no public good, so
we set ωy  0. Let ω  (ωx,ωy) 2 RN
+  R+. The production set is a
subset of R2 denoted Y , with inputs measured negatively and outputs mea-
sured positively. An economy with agent set N is a list (R,ω,Y ) in
some domain EN deﬁned by imposing restrictions on preferences (such as
continuity and convexity) and on the production set (such as convexity). A




(ωix xi),y) 2 Y . Agent i's consumption at z is the pair
zi  (xi,y). Let Z(!;Y ) denote the set of feasible allocations of (R,ω,Y ).
We work with a linear technology: there is α 2 R+ such that the production
of each unit of the public good requires α units of input. We choose units of
measurement of the goods so that α = 1.
Our results pertain to the classical domain, when preferences are con-
tinuous, convex, and monotonic (an increase in the consumption of any of the
goods makes an agent better oﬀ), and two important subdomains, deﬁned
as follows. The preference relation Ri is quasi-linear if indiﬀerence between
bundles is preserved under translations of these bundles parallel to the pri-
vate good axis by any non-negative amount: for each pair fzi,z′
ig 2 R2
+ and
each t 2 R+, if zi Ii z′
i, then (zi + (t,0)) Ii (z′
i + (t,0)).4 The preference
3The notation RN and RN
+ designates the cross-product of jNj copies of R and R+
respectively indexed by the elements of N.
4A common alternative speciﬁcation of the quasi-linearity assumption is obtained by
dropping the requirement that the consumption of the private good be non-negative, and
in fact, letting it be unbounded below. Then, the Pareto set is invariant under arbitrary
(in sign and magnitude) transfers of the private good. This makes working with this model
4relation Ri is homothetic if indiﬀerence between bundles is preserved under
homothetic transformations of these bundles: for each pair fzi,z′
ig 2 R2
+ and
each λ 2 R+, if zi Ii z′
i, then λzi Ii λz′
i. Let Rcl denote the domain of classi-
cal preferences. Let Rql and Rhom denote the domain of preferences, that,
in addition to satisfying the classical assumptions, are quasi-linear and ho-
mothetic respectively. Let EN
cl , EN
ql , and EN
hom be the corresponding domains
of economies. Let EN be a generic domain of economies.
Given a domain EN, a solution on EN is a mapping φ associating with
each (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN a non-empty subset of Z(ω,Y ), denoted φ(R,ω,Y ).
We use the term rule when the mapping is single-valued. A solution φ is
essentially single-valued if for each (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN, each pair fz,z′g 
φ(R,ω,Y ), and each i 2 N, zi Ii z′
i.5 The Pareto solution, P, associates
with each economy its set of allocations such that there is no other allocation
that each agent ﬁnds at least as desirable, and at least one agent prefers:
z 2 P(R,ω,Y ) if z 2 Z(ω,Y ) and there is no z′ 2 Z(ω,Y ) such that for
each i 2 N, z′
i Ri zi, and for at least one i 2 N, z′
i Pi zi.
Given a1,a2 2 R2
+, we designate by seg[a1;a2] the segment con-
necting these two points. Given a1,...,ak 2 R2
+, we designate by
bro:seg[a1;:::;ak] the broken segment seg[a1,a2] [  [ seg[ak−1,ak].
3 Open-economy borrowing-proofness
Next is a formal statement of our requirement of immunity to manipulation
through borrowing from the outside. Agent i is the borrower and he augments
his endowment of the private good from ωix to ω′
ix by borrowing. (Obviously,
one cannot borrow a public good.) Given ωx 2 RN
+ and i 2 N, we denote by
ω−ix the vector obtained from ωx by dropping its i-th coordinate. Let φ be
a solution.
Open-economy borrowing-proofness: For each e  (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN,
each i 2 N, and each ω′ 2 RN
+  R+, if ω′
ix > ωix, ω′
−ix = ω−ix, and
ω′
y = 0, then it is not the case that for some z 2 φ(R,ω,Y ) and for some
z′ 2 φ(R,ω′,Y ), [z′
i   (ω′
ix   ωix,0)] Pi zi.
particularly easy.
5We could also speak of a rule being single-valued up to Pareto-indiﬀerence.
5For an agent to want to borrow, he should ﬁrst be able to return what he
borrowed. Thus, the property is written in the negative. We should worry
about him borrowing only if he is able to return what he borrowed and after
doing so, ends up better oﬀ.
We could have stated the deﬁnition for single-valued solutions. In the
strategic analysis of allocation correspondences, to each strategy is associated
a set of outcomes, and the question comes up how a player bases his choice of
a strategy on comparisons of sets of outcomes. This question does not arise
for a single-valued solution, that is, for what we called a “rule”. We wrote
our deﬁnition with existential quantiﬁers on the allocations chosen before
and after the manipulation. This means that no matter what choice would
be made if he did not borrow, an agent would evaluate optimistically the
choice that would be made if he did borrow. However, our results are proved
in situations in which the solution that interests us here is single-valued.6
An alternative deﬁnition is obtained by imagining that the borrower ob-
tains resources from one of his fellow traders, instead of from an unspeciﬁed
outside world. In general, the bundle the rule assigns to the lender will
change when the rule is operated from the reshuﬄed endowments, and he
may ﬁnd his new bundle worse than the bundle he would have received if
he had not lent. For him to accept lending, it should be the case that after
getting back the resources he lent, he does end up at least as well oﬀ as if he
had not lent. The possibility of improving one’s welfare by borrowing “from
within” is discussed in Section 5.
We prove our negative results and illustrate our positive ones concerning
open-economy borrowing-proofnessby means of two-agent examples. Then,
we can use the geometric device known as the Kolm triangle (Kolm,
1970). We assume familiarity with this device (for a didactic exposition,
see Thomson, 1999). The essential features are as follows. Let N  f1,2g
and e  (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN be an economy with a linear (normalized, that is,
each unit of output requiring one unit of input) technology. An allocation
z  (x1,x2,y) 2 Z(ω,Y ) is represented as a point in an equilateral trian-
gle of height ω1x + ω2x. The lower left and lower right corners, labeled 01
6One could allow for essential single-valuedness, but Pareto-indiﬀerence of the alloca-
tions chosen for the reported proﬁle of endowments would not necessarily imply Pareto-
indiﬀerence after the amounts borrowed have been returned. Thus, the problem of speci-
fying how an agent compares sets of allocations would still have to be faced. The issue is
discussed by Thomson (1979). A concept of immunity to manipulation for correspondences
is studied by Ching and Zhou (2002), but other formulations have been proposed.
6and 02, are origins. The two agents’ consumptions are measured from these
points. Their consumptions x1 and x2 of the private good are measured by
the distances from z to the left and right sides of the triangle (and not by
the horizontal distances from z to these sides); their common consumption
of the public good is measured by the vertical distance from z to the base of
the triangle.
On either the quasi-linear domain or the homothetic domain, the Pareto
set has a simple structure, even more so if in fact preferences are strictly
convex, as depicted in our ﬁgures.
The key implication of quasi-linearity for convex preferences, in either
the standard rectangular axes or in the slanted axes of the Kolm triangle
representation, is that for each agent i 2 N and each pair of bundles zi 
(xi,y) and z′
i  (x′
i,y′), the line(s) of support to his upper contour set at zi
is (are) at least as steep as the line(s) of support to his upper contour set at
z′
i if and only if y  y′. If preferences are strictly convex and z is an eﬃcient
allocation, no other allocation is Pareto-indiﬀerent to it. Then, in the Kolm
triangle, under quasi-linearity, the Pareto set has three parts, which to save
space, we do not show on a separate ﬁgure, but on Figure 3, used later to
prove one of our results. Consider the triangle with origins 01 and 02 in that
ﬁgure. The true endowment proﬁle corresponds to the point marked ω. For
each i 2 N, zi designates the most preferred allocation for agent i in that
triangle. The three parts then are (i) a horizontal segment from the left side
of the triangle to the right side, seg[a1,a2], at each point of which indiﬀerence
curves admit a common line of support; (ii) a segment lying in the left side of
the triangle, seg[z2,a1], and (iii) a segment lying in its right side, seg[z1,a2].
Given zi 2 R2
+ n f0ig, we designate by (0i;zi) the ray emanating from
agent i’s origin 0i and passing through zi. The key implication of homoth-
eticity for convex preferences is that for each agent i 2 N and each pair of
bundles zi  (xi,y) and z′
i  (x′
i,y′), the line(s) of support to his upper con-
tour set at zi is (are) at least as steep as the line(s) of support to his upper
contour set at z′
i if and only if ρ(0i,zi) is at least as steep as ρ(0i,z′
i). In the
Kolm triangle, under strict convexity and homotheticity, the Pareto set is a
curve connecting the slanted sides of the triangle that satisﬁes the following
property. If z is an eﬃcient allocation, the rest of the Pareto set lies entirely
in the bow-tie shaped area between the rays emanating from the two origins
7and passing through z, ρ(01,z1) and ρ(02,z2).7
The solution deﬁned by Lindahl (1919) can be considered as a counterpart
for public good economies of the Walrasian rule, as it calls for each agent
to maximize his preferences on a budget line. The main diﬀerence is that
prices for public goods (in terms of the private good) are individualized. The
producer faces a price for the public good that is the sum of the prices faced
by the consumers. Proﬁts made in production are distributed according to
a vector θ 2 ∆N of proﬁt shares. The Lindahl solution, L, associates
with each economy its set of allocations that can be supported by prices:
z  (x,y) 2 L(R,ω,Y ) (here, the technology Y does not have to be linear) if
z 2 Z(ω,Y ) and there is p  (pi)i∈N 2 RN
+ such that for each i 2 N, xi+piy 
ωix, and for each z′
i  (x′
i,y′) 2 R2




where z∗ 2 Y is a production plan maximizing ( 1,
∑
pi)z for z 2 Y , we
have zi Ri z′
i. The prices p are called “equilibrium prices”. An agent’s
“oﬀer curve” is deﬁned as in Walrasian analysis, by tracing out the agent’s
maximizing bundle as a function of the prices he faces. Let agent i’s oﬀer
curve from endowment ωi be denoted oc(Ri;!i) (preferences being ﬁxed,
in the ﬁgures, we use the more compact notation oc(!i)). In the Kolm
triangle, the Lindahl allocations are obtained in the same way that Walrasian
allocations are in the Edgeworth box, by intersecting oﬀer curves.
We specify the counterexamples used for our negative results geometri-
cally, introducing them in such a way as to make it as intuitive as possible
how we arrived at them. We do not give explicit analytical expressions for
representations of preferences. Such expressions would often be quite com-
plicated without shedding any additional light on the nature of the results.
Figure 1 shows how to accommodate borrowing. We always consider
borrowing by agent 1, calling β > 0 the amount he borrows. We need to
enlarge the triangle by this amount. We keep his origin ﬁxed at 01, and
translate agent 2’s origin to the right by the vector ( 2 √
3β,0), denoting his
new origin 0′
2. We also translate the endowment proﬁle and any data that
pertains to agent 2 in the original triangle (indiﬀerence curves, consumptions)
7The proof is simple. Let z 2 P(e). In the Kolm triangle, the lines of support to the
two agents’ indiﬀerence curves at z coincide. Let z′ be another feasible allocation. If z′ is
above ρ(01,z1), agent 1’s line(s) of support at z′
1 is (are) steeper than its line(s) of support
at z1. If z′ is also above ρ(02,z2), agent 2’s line(s) of support at z′
2 is (are) ﬂatter than its
line(s) of support at z2. Thus, the lines of support at z′
1 and z′
2 cross. The same argument
can be made about any point that is below both ρ(01,z1) and ρ(02,z2). The remaining
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Figure 1: Enlarging a Kolm triangle so as to accommodate borrowing.
by this vector, since all of these objects have to be re-measured from 0′
2. Let
tr(!;!′) be this horizontal translation. In the ﬁgure, the segments seg[a,ω′],
seg[b,0′
2], and seg[c,z′] all have length β. Suppose a rule selects z for (R,ω,Y )
and z′ for (R,ω′,Y ). Agent 1’s ﬁnal consumption, once he has returned what
he borrowed, is the pair consisting of the ﬁrst and third components of the
allocation ˜ z obtained by translating z′ by the vector (  2 √
3β,0) (this is the
translation  tr(ω,ω′)). We now compare z1 to ˜ z1  z′
1  (β,0). For the rule
to be open-economy borrowing-proof, z1 should always be at least as desirable
as ˜ z1 according to R1. In Figure 1, that is not the case, so the property is
violated.
The ﬁgure shows that even if a rule is designed to select eﬃcient alloca-
tions (note that indiﬀerence curves are tangent at z in the original triangle
and also at z′ in the enlarged triangle), the allocation that results after the
borrower has returned the resources he borrowed may not be eﬃcient. In-
deed, the indiﬀerence curves through ˜ z are typically not tangent there. This
is of course one of the reasons why we should be concerned about borrowing.
We show that on both the quasi-linear domain and on the homothetic
domain, the Lindahl rule is open-economy borrowing-proof.
On the quasi-linear domain, we may think that if an allocation is eﬃcient,
so is any other allocation obtained by horizontal translation to the left or
to the right, and that translation invariance of any rule would imply its
open-economy borrowing-proofness. However, one should be careful about
boundaries, and even on its subdomain on which it selects interior allocations,




































Figure 2: Oﬀer curves for quasi-linear preferences.
property whenever it selects interior allocations, but other appealing rules
exist that do not.
Figure 2 shows what happens to an agent’s oﬀer curve as his endowment
decreases. As we will soon embed agent 1’s map into a Kolm triangle, let
us work within slanted axes. For the endowment ω1
1, agent 1’s oﬀer curve
never reaches the slanted axis8 and that is also the case for any endowment
to the right of ω1
1 and for a range of endowments to the left of ω1
1, such as ω2
1.
The bundles maximizing his preferences on two parallel price lines, if both
bundles are interior, are related by a horizontal translation. Examples are the
points z1
1 and z2
1, which maximize his preferences on two parallel budget lines
emanating from ω1
1 and ω2
1. His oﬀer curve for the endowment ω3
1 is obtained
by translating his oﬀer curve for ω1
1 and truncating it by the slanted axis:
in the ﬁgure, it consists of the arc from ω3
1 to a and the part of that axis
that is above a. For the even smaller endowment ω4
1, the truncation is more
signiﬁcant and the oﬀer curve consists of the arc from ω4
1 to ˜ a and the part
of the left slanted axis that is above ˜ a. The point z′
1 is a maximizer of the
agent’s preferences on a price line emanating from ω4
1.
On the quasi-linear domain with strictly convex and smooth preferences,
the Lindahl correspondence is single-valued. This conclusion holds because
each agent’s demand for the public good is a monotonic function of the price
of that good (relative to that of the private good) that he faces.



























Figure 3: On the domain of strictly convex, smooth, and quasi-linear
preferences, the Lindahl rule is open-economy borrowing-proof (Propo-
sition 1).
Proposition 1 On the domain of strictly convex, smooth, and quasi-linear
preferences, the Lindahl rule is open-economy borrowing-proof.
Proof: The proof is illustrated in Figure 3 for a strictly convex and smooth
economy (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN
ql , where N  f1,2g. The proof for more than
two agents is essentially the same and we omit it. Let z  (x1,x2,y) 
L(R,ω,Y ). Agent 1 borrows the amount β of the private good. Let ω′ be the
new endowment proﬁle in the enlarged Kolm triangle and z′  L(R,ω′,Y ).
If x1 > 0 (as illustrated in the ﬁgure), then z′
1 = z1 + (β,0). Indeed, by the
translation invariance of indiﬀerence curves, the price line that makes z a
Lindahl allocation in the original economy, when translated by the amount
borrowed, is a price line that makes the translate of z by tr(ω,ω′) a Lindahl
allocation in the augmented economy: the allocation chosen by the Lindahl
rule moves in a co-variant way with agent 1’s borrowing. After returning
the amount borrowed, he ends up with the same bundle as he would have
received had he not borrowed. (If agent 2’s consumption of the private good
is zero initially, such as at z′′ in the ﬁgure, the argument is the same as for
interior Lindahl allocations.)
For an endowment proﬁle suﬃciently close to 01, such as ω∗ in the ﬁgure,
the resulting Lindahl allocation z∗  L(R,ω∗,Y ) is a boundary allocation
(x∗
1 = 0). If agent 1 borrows an amount that brings the endowment allocation
to a point such as ω1, the new Lindahl allocation is a1, a boundary allocation





























Figure 4: On the domain of strictly convex and homothetic preferences,
the Lindahl rule is open-economy borrowing-proof (Proposition 2).
same observation holds for any borrowed amount that brings the endowment
allocation to a point of seg[ω∗,ω1], the resulting Lindahl allocation being a
point of seg[z∗,a1]. If he borrows enough for the resulting Lindahl alloca-
tion to be interior—for instance, if the new endowment allocation is ω, the
Lindahl allocation is z—but he ends up paying more per unit of the public
good than he did initially, and he receives less of the private good than he
borrowed. Thus, his new assignment is still insuﬃcient for him to return
what he borrowed. 
On the homothetic domain with strictly convex preferences, the Lindahl
rule is single-valued. Just like for the quasi-linear case, this is because each
agent’s demand for the public good is a strictly decreasing function of the
price of that good (relative to that of the private good) that he faces.
Proposition 2 On the domain of strictly convex and homothetic prefer-
ences, the Lindahl rule is open-economy borrowing-proof.
Proof: The proof is illustrated in Figure 4 for a strictly convex economy
(R,ω,Y ) 2 EN
hom, where N  f1,2g. The proof for more than two agents is
essentially the same. Let z  L(R,ω,Y ). Agent 1 borrows the amount β
of the private good. Let ω′ be the new endowment proﬁle in the enlarged
Kolm triangle and z′  L(R,ω′,Y ). Agent 1’s oﬀer curve from ω′
1, oc(ω′
1),
goes through the point a obtained by subjecting z to the same homothetic























Figure 5: On the classical domain, the Lindahl rule is not open-economy
borrowing-proof (Example 1).
measured from 0′
2 is obtained by subjecting oc(ω2) to tr(ω,ω′). The point b
is the image of z under that translation. It follows from these facts that oc(ω′
1)
and oc′(ω2) cross at a point z′ to the left of the line obtained by subjecting
the initial equilibrium price line to tr(ω,ω′). Agent 1’s ﬁnal consumption
is obtained by subjecting z′
1 to the inverse translation,  tr(ω,ω′), and it is
therefore to the left of the initial equilibrium price line. Agent 1 does not
beneﬁt from borrowing. 
It is not diﬃcult to see that as long as the public good is a normal good,
the reasoning just made applies. In their analysis of the endowment misrep-
resentation game associated with the Lindahl rule, Sertel and Sanver (1999)
note that if the public good is a normal good, then at equilibrium, agents do
not exaggerate their endowments. This result implies the conclusions that
we have reached by means of our graphical analysis.
Finally, we consider the classical domain and show by means of an econ-
omy with strictly convex preferences (Example 1) that, now, open-economy
borrowing-proofness fails.
Example 1 On the strictly convex and classical domain, the Lindahl rule
is not open-economy borrowing-proof. The proof is by means of a strictly
convex economy (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN
cl , where N  f1,2g, illustrated in Figures 5
and 6. Agent 1’s intended oﬀer curve from ω1, oc(ω1), consists of a backward-
bending arc from ω1 to a point z on the vertical line through ω, followed by









































Figure 6: Generating agent 1’s map for Example 1.
the same, so his oﬀer curve from ω2 is the symmetric image of oc(ω1) with
respect to the vertical line through ω. The oﬀer curves oc(ω1) and oc(ω2)
intersect at ω and z. Thus, fzg = L(R,ω,Y ).
Let β > 0. Agent 1 borrows the amount β of the private good. We
enlarge the Kolm triangle so as to accommodate the increase in his endow-
ment. Let ω′ be the new endowment proﬁle. In the enlarged Kolm triangle,
let oc′(ω2) be agent 2’s oﬀer curve redrawn from ω′
2. It is the translate of
oc(ω2) by tr(ω,ω′). Let z′ be a point of oc′(ω2) whose public good compo-
nent is smaller than the public good component of z. Agent 1’s intended
oﬀer curve from ω′
1, oc(ω′
1), consists of a backward-bending arc from ω′
1 to z′,
also followed by a half-line parallel to the left side of the triangle. It admits
a vertical tangency line at ω′
1. Our objective is to specify preferences for
agent 1 rationalizing oc(ω1) as his oﬀer curve from ω1 and oc(ω′
1) as his oﬀer
curve from ω′
1.
We show in Figure 6 how to construct agent 1’s indiﬀerence curve through
ω′
1 as well as all of his higher indiﬀerence curves. Let a be obtained from z
by tr(ω,ω′) and M be the half-line emanating from a that is parallel to the
left side of the triangle. Let ¯ ℓ be any line emanating from ω′ whose slope is
positive and greater than the slope of the left side of the triangle (Figure 6a).
We will associate with it a point of oc(ω1) and a point of oc(ω′
1). Let ¯ z be
the point of intersection of ¯ ℓ with oc(ω′
1). The line ¯ ℓ intersects M at ¯ a. Next,
we draw the line ¯ m from ω passing through ¯ a. This line intersects oc(ω1)
at ¯ b. We now draw an indiﬀerence curve for agent 1 that is tangent to ¯ ℓ at ¯ z
and to ¯ m at ¯ b. We have rationalized ¯ z as a point of oc(ω′
1) and ¯ b as a point
14of oc(ω1).
As ¯ ℓ becomes steeper and steeper, the point ¯ z gets closer and closer to ω′.
At the limit, ¯ ℓ is vertical and ¯ z = ω′ (Figure 6b). Let us refer to ¯ ℓ when
it assumes this vertical position as ℓ. Then, it intersects M at a and the
line m from ω passing through a intersects oc(ω1) at b. Now, we draw an
indiﬀerence curve for agent 1 that is tangent to ℓ at ω′
1 and tangent to m
at b. This is the left-most indiﬀerence curve that we generate for agent 1 in
this manner. We have rationalized ω′ as a point of oc(ω′
1) and b as a point
of oc(ω1).
All of these indiﬀerence curves can be drawn without crossing, and we
have now generated all of agent 1’s indiﬀerence curves to the right of the
indiﬀerence curve through ω′, and in the process rationalized the part of
oc(ω1) that lies above b as well as the whole of oc(ω′
1). Note that because z′
is to the right of ℓ, its translate by  tr(ω,ω′) is to the right of the vertical line
through ω. It is now easy to complete R1 to the left of the indiﬀerence curve
through ω′ that we just speciﬁed for him so as to rationalize the remainder of
oc(ω1) (the arc from ω to z and the segment [z,b]), and so that the indiﬀerence
curve through z passes to the left of the translate of z′ by  tr(ω,ω′). Then,
agent 1 prefers his ﬁnal bundle, ˜ z1  z′
1  (β,0), to z1. He is made better oﬀ
through borrowing.
Note that because none of the oﬀer curves involved in the construction
bends back down, in each of the two economies we consider, the economy
with endowment proﬁle ω and the economy with endowment proﬁle (ω′
1,ω2),
there is a unique Lindahl allocation. 
Remark 1 In the construction of the example, we ﬁx ω and then specify β
to be an arbitrary positive number. Thus, the example shows that no matter
how small the amount is that agent 1 is allowed to borrow in relation to his
endowment, his preferences may be such that he can beneﬁt from doing so.
4 Borrowing versus withholding
Another form of manipulation has been considered in the literature. It in-
volves withholding of some of one’s endowment for private consumption later.
A rule is withholding-proof if no agent ever beneﬁts from such behavior.
Withholding-proofness: For each e  (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN, each i 2 N, and
each ω′ 2 RN
+  R+, if ω′
ix < ωix, ω′
−ix = ω−ix, and ω′
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Figure 7: On the strictly convex, smooth, and quasi-linear domain, the
Lindahl rule is not withholding-proof (Example 2).




It is known that the Lindahl rule is not withholding-proof on the classical
domain (Thomson, 1979, 1999). The examples described next show that this
negative result still holds on either the strictly convex, smooth, and quasi-
linear domain, or on the strictly convex and homothetic domain. Thus, in
the light of Section 3, it appears that open-economy borrowing-proofness is
satisﬁed more generally than withholding-proofness.
Example 2 On the domain of strictly convex, smooth, and quasi-linear pref-
erences, the Lindahl rule is not withholding-proof. The proof is by means of a
strictly convex and smooth economy (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN
ql , where N  f1,2g, illus-
trated in Figure 7. Let z  L(R,ω,Y ). Agent 1 withholds the amount β of
the private good. Let ω′ be the new endowment proﬁle in the reduced Kolm
triangle. Let z′  L(R,ω′,Y ). This allocation is the intersection of oc(ω′
1),
which is truncated, and oc′(ω2). The price faced by agent 1 for the public
good at equilibrium has turned in his favor. After adding to z′
1 the vector
agent 1 withheld, we obtain z′
1 + (β,0). To show a violation of withholding-
proofness, it now suﬃces to draw agent 1’s indiﬀerence curve through z1
suﬃciently close to the line passing through ω and z to ensure that agent 1
prefers z′
1 + (β,0) to z1. Then, he beneﬁts from withholding.
If we had started from the endowment proﬁle ω, for which the resulting































Figure 8: On the strictly convex and homothetic domain, the Lindahl
rule is not withholding-proof (Example 3).
held, the new endowment proﬁle would have resulted in an interior Lindahl
allocation. In the ﬁgure, an endowment proﬁle that achieves this is ω′. Then
the Lindahl allocation from this new endowment, z′ on the ﬁgure, would be
obtained from the Lindahl allocation from ω by tr(ω,ω′), and agent 1 would
not have beneﬁtted from withholding. 
Example 3 On the domain of strictly convex and homothetic preferences,
the Lindahl rule is not withholding-proof. The proof is by means of a strictly
convex economy (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN
hom, where N  f1,2g, illustrated in Figure 8.
Let z  L(R,ω,Y ). Agent 1 withholds the amount β of the private good.
Let ω′ be the new endowment proﬁle in the reduced Kolm triangle and z′ 
L(R,ω′,Y ). The essential characteristic of agent 1’s oﬀer curve from his new
endowment, oc(ω′
1), is that on each price line that he may face, agent 1’s most
preferred trade is smaller than it was from his initial endowment. Agent 2’s
oﬀer curve measured from the new origin 0′
2 in the reduced triangle, oc′(ω2),
is obtained by subjecting his initial oﬀer curve oc(ω2) to tr(ω,ω′). The two
oﬀer curves from ω′ cross to the right of the line obtained by subjecting the
initial equilibrium price line to tr(ω,ω′). Thus, z′
1+(β,0) is to the right of the
initial equilibrium price line. It now suﬃces to draw agent 1’s indiﬀerence
curve through z1 suﬃciently close to the line passing through ω and z to
ensure that agent 1 beneﬁts from withholding. 
Remark 2 A parallel observation to one made in connection to Example 1
17holds: Examples 2 and 3 show that no matter how small the amount is that
agent 1 withholds in relation to his endowment, his preferences may be such
that he could beneﬁt from doing so.
Both borrowing and withholding have the eﬀect of “bringing the atten-
tion of the rule” to a diﬀerent part of the manipulating agent’s consumption
space. An examination of the proofs of our results concerning the two behav-
iors reveals that the diﬀerence in the conclusions comes from the fact that for
the classes of preferences on which we have focused, quasi-linear preferences
and homothetic preferences, augmenting one’s endowment through borrow-
ing and decreasing it through withholding have predictably opposite eﬀects
on oﬀer curves; in the borrowing case, demand for the public good increases
at every price, and in the withholding case, demand decreases at every price.
Because the other agent has a well-behaved map, this leads to a predictably
more favorable individualized price for the manipulating agent in the case of
withholding, and a predictably less favorable individualized price for him in
the case of borrowing.
5 Closed-economy borrowing-proofness
Let us now imagine that an agent borrows from some other agent present
in the economy, not from outside sources; after the rule is applied, and the
agent has returned what he borrowed, he may be better oﬀ, but in order to
guarantee the participation of the agent from whom he borrowed, this agent
should end up at least as well oﬀ as he would have been otherwise. (Of
course, the borrower could borrow from several agents. Then each of them
should end up at least as well oﬀ as if he had not borrowed.) The property
of immunity to behavior of this kind is formulated in Thomson (2005) under
the name of “closed-economy borrowing-proofness”. For a selection from the
Pareto correspondence, this property is automatically met if there are only
two agents, so we need to consider economies with a least three agents, and
the Kolm triangle is not available anymore. Formally, the requirement is the
following:
Closed-economy borrowing-proofness: For each e  (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN,
each fi,jg  N, and each ω′ 2 RN
+R+, if ω′
ix > ωix, ω′
ix+ω′
jx = ωix+ωjx, for
each k 2 Nnfi,jg, ω′
kx = ωkx, and ω′
y = 0, then it is not the case that for some
18z 2 φ(R,ω,Y ) and some z′ 2 φ(R,ω′,Y ), we have [z′
i   (ω′
ix   ωix,0)] Pi zi
and [z′
j + (ω′
ix   ωix,0)] Rj zj.
We start with two positive results.
Proposition 3 On the domain of strictly convex, smooth, and quasi-linear
preferences, the Lindahl rule is closed-economy borrowing-proof.
Proof: Consider a strictly convex and smooth economy (R,ω,Y ) 2 EN
ql , and
let z 2 L(R,ω,Y ). Let fi,jg  N and suppose that agent i borrows the
amount β of the private good from agent j. Let ω′
ix  ωix+β, ω′
jx  ωjx β,
and for each k 2 N n fi,jg, ω′
kx  ωkx, and ω′
y = 0. Let z′  L(R,ω′,Y ).
Agent i’s ﬁnal bundle is z′
i   (β,0). For him to beneﬁt, he should face a
lower price for the public good (his budget line should become steeper). By
quasi-linearity, this implies that y′ > y. For each k 2 N n fig, if z′
k is a
maximizing consumption bundle in agent k’s budget set, the price he should
face for the public good should be at most as large as it was initially. However
it is incompatible with feasibility that every agent faces a lower price. 
Proposition 4 On the domain of strictly convex and homothetic prefer-
ences, the Lindahl rule is closed-economy borrowing-proof.
Proof: The proof is the same as that of Proposition 3 until the sentence
beginning with “By quasi-linearity” but the same conclusion is reached by
invoking homotheticity. The proof concludes as does the previous one. 
The proofs of the two previous propositions make it clear that what un-
derlies them is, once again, normality of the public good. On the classical
domain, this property is not necessarily met, and we have the following neg-
ative result.
Example 4 On the strictly convex, smooth, and classical domain, the Lin-
dahl rule is not closed-economy borrowing-proof. Let N  f1,2,3g. The
proof is by means of an economy in EN
cl with strictly convex and smooth
preferences (Figures 9 and 10). The initial endowment proﬁle is denoted
ω 2 RN
+  R+. Agent 1 borrows resources from agent 2, the resulting en-
dowment proﬁle being denoted ω′. The production technology is linear, each
unit of input yielding one unit of output, and as before, the production set







































































Figure 9: On the strictly convex, smooth, and classical domain, the
Lindahl rule is not closed-economy borrowing-proof (Example 4).
is (R,ω′,Y ). There is a unique Lindahl allocation, both initially and after
the change in endowments.
Let ω1x, ω′
1x,β 2 R+ be such that ω′
1x = ω1x + β. Let y,y′ > 0 be such
that y < y′. Let ω2x, ω′
2x > 0 be such that ω′
2x = ω2x β. Let p2, p′
2 2 R+ be
such that (i) 0 < p′
2 < p2 < 1, (ii) the point z′
2 of ordinate y′ on the line ℓ′
2
emanating from ω′
2 and normal to (1,p′
2) has a positive abscissa, and (iii) the
point z2 of ordinate y on the line ℓ2 emanating from ω2 and normal to (1,p2)
is to the right of ℓ′
2. These conditions imply that z2 has a positive abscissa.
Let p1, p′
1 2 R+ be such that (i) 0 < p′
1 < p1 and p3  1 p1 p2 < 1 and
(ii) the point z1 of ordinate y on the line ℓ1 emanating from ω1 and normal
to (1,p1) and the point z′
1 of ordinate y′ on the line ℓ′
1 emanating from ω′
1
and normal to (1,p′
1) have positive abscissas. Let p′




1 < p1 and p′
2 < p2, then p′
3 > p3. Let ω3x 2 R+ be such that the point
z′
3 of ordinate y′ on the line ℓ′
3 emanating from ω3 and normal to (1,p′
3) has
a positive abscissa. (The ﬁgures depict an economy for which p1 = p2 = p3
and p′
1 = p′
2.) Since y < y′ and p3 < p′
3, the point z3 of ordinate y on the
line ℓ3 emanating from ω3 and normal to (1,p3) also has a positive abscissa.
Next, we specify oﬀer curves, at ﬁrst not insisting on either strict convexity
or smoothness of preferences.
Let R1 be such that (i) the indiﬀerence curve through ω1 consists of
seg[ω1,z1] and the vertical half-line emanating from z1, and (ii) the indiﬀer-
ence curve through ω′
1 consists of seg[ω′
1,z′
1] and the vertical half-line ema-
nating from z′
1. It follows from (i) that oc(ω1) contains seg[ω1,z1] and that



































































Figure 10: On the strictly convex, smooth, and classical domain, the
Lindahl rule is not closed-economy borrowing-proof (Example 4 contin-
ued).




and that above the horizontal line of ordinate y′, it lies to the right of the
half-line emanating from z′
1.
Let R2 be such that (i) the indiﬀerence curve through ω2 consists of
seg[ω2,z2] and the vertical half-line emanating from z2, and (ii) the indiﬀer-
ence curve through ω′
2 consist of seg[ω′
2,z′
2] and the vertical half-line ema-
nating from z′
2. It follows from (i) that oc(ω2) contains seg[ω2,z2] and that
above the horizontal line of ordinate y, it lies to the right of the half-line em-




and that above the horizontal line of ordinate y′, it lies to the right of the
half-line emanating from z′
2.
Let a  (a1,a2) 2 R2
+ be such that a1 = x′
3 and a2 < y′ (say a2 = y).
Let R3 be such that oc3(ω3) consists of bro.seg[ω3,a,z′
3,z3], followed by the
vertical half-line emanating from z3.
Let ωx  (ω1x,ω2x,ω3x), ω′




3x). Let z 
(x1,x2,x3,y) and z′  (x′
1,x′
2,x′
3,y′). We have z 2 L(R,ω,Y ) and z′ 2
L(R,ω′,Y ). We claim that in fact, z and z′ are the only Lindahl allocations
for ω and ω′ respectively. For each ˜ y 2 R+, we identify the individualized
prices for the public good at which each of the three agents would demand this
level of the public good. From these, we deduce the total amount collected
21if the public good is oﬀered at level ˜ y. For a Lindahl equilibrium, this total
should be equal to the cost of producing the public good at that level. Given
our assumptions on the technology, this cost is also ˜ y. Geometrically, it is
convenient to translate the three oﬀer curves horizontally to the origin, add
them up horizontally, then check if the resulting aggregate demand curve and
the supply curve, which is simply the line of slope  1 emanating from the
origin, cross at a point of ordinate ˜ y. If this is the only point of intersection,
we have a unique Lindahl allocation. In Figures 9 and 10, the translated
oﬀer curves of the initial economy are denoted oct(ω1), oct(ω2), and oct(ω3).
Their aggregate is denoted
∑
oct(ωi). After agent 1 borrows from agent 2,
these two agents’ translated oﬀer curves are denoted oct(ω′
1) and oct(ω′
2). The
aggregate translated oﬀer curve is then written as oct(ω′
1)+oct(ω′
2)+oct(ω3).
In Figures 9 and 10, uniqueness of the points of intersection of the aggre-
gate demand curve and the supply curve can be veriﬁed.
The Lindahl allocation z′ for the endowment proﬁle ω′ is such that, deﬁn-
ing ˜ z  (z′
1   (β,0),z′
2 + (β,0)), we have ˜ z1 P1 z1 and ˜ z2 R2 z2. To conclude
the proof, it suﬃces to take strictly convex and smooth approximations to
the preferences just deﬁned. This can easily be done but once again, we
dispense with analytical expressions.9 
Remark 3 Here too, a similar observation to Remark 1 made in connection
to Example 1 holds: Example 4 can be speciﬁed, and we have constructed it
with that objective in mind, to show that no matter how small the amount
that agent 1 is allowed to borrow in relation to his endowment and in rela-
tion to the endowment of the lender, (we may require for instance that the
ratio of the amount borrowed over either of these endowments not exceed a
certain value,) there are economies such that he could beneﬁt from borrow-
ing. When introducing ω1x and β, it suﬃces to add the requirement that

!1x
be no greater than the desired value; then, in introducing ω2x, to add the
requirement that

!2x also be no greater than the desired value.
6 Conclusion
We close by relating our study to existing literature and stating open ques-
tions. The present paper is indeed only a ﬁrst step in the study of the
opportunity through manipulation of endowments that we envision.
9The preferences of both agents 1 and 2 can in addition be speciﬁed to be homothetic.
221. More than one private good. In a related paper in which we exam-
ine borrowing-proofness in the context of classical private good economies
(Thomson, 2009), we obtain a number of negative results concerning the
compatibility of this requirement with eﬃciency and one or the other of sev-
eral distributional requirements. We prove these results for economies with
two goods. Such conclusions can easily be extended to economies in which
public goods are also present. It suﬃces to specify preferences so that, at
all eﬃcient allocations, the public goods are not produced because the de-
mand does not justify the expense. Thus, we have limited ourselves here
to economies with only one private good. Since the public goods themselves
cannot be borrowed, manipulation opportunities through borrowing are more
limited in the present context than they are in economies with only private
goods. Our results are somewhat more positive than in such economies, as
we have found a number of natural preference domains on which the Lindahl
solution is immune to manipulation through borrowing.
2. Other rules. In a companion paper (Thomson, 2010), we study the
borrowing-proofness of other allocation rules in the context of the same
model. These rules are inspired by the literature on fairness.
3. Introducing a cost of borrowing. To be able to borrow, an agent should
in general pay a fee.10 The higher the fee, the less likely will borrowing
be worthwhile. Thus, it would be interesting to obtain results describing
the extent to which introducing a cost of borrowing will prevent the sort of
manipulation with which we are concerned. However, results independent
of the preference proﬁle and of the particular initial endowment proﬁle are
unlikely.
4. Manipulation involving groups of agents. Other, more sophisticated,
forms of borrowing than the one we have analyzed can be deﬁned, involving
groups of agents.
First, several agents may coordinate their borrowing and, after each of
them has returned what he borrowed, each of them end up with a bundle
they he prefers.
Second, their opportunities to gain may be enhanced if, instead of each of
them returning the very bundle that he borrowed, they jointly return what
they borrowed in total.
10We do not want to use the expression “interest rate” because, as we noted earlier, our
model is not an intertemporal one.
23Third, they may obtain additional improvements in their welfares if, af-
ter returning what they borrowed individually or a group, they carry out
transfers among themselves.
Fourth, in a closed economy, as long as a lender’s welfare ends up at least
as high at what it would have been if he did not lent, he should be willing to
lend; thus, one could specify the obligation of the borrowers to simply return
a bundle that allows the lender to achieve the welfare he would achieve if he
had not lent. The idea can be applied to borrowing by a group from some
other group.
We leave the analysis of these behaviors to future study, limiting ourselves
to noting that for each of the negative results we have obtained by focusing
on manipulation by one agent only, the situation is of course worsened when
agents may coordinate their manipulation.
5. Borrowing games. Once it is known that a rule is not immune to
manipulation, one may want to understand what happens when all agents
attempt separately to manipulate to their own advantage. Full-ﬂedged game
theoretic analysis of a rule requires that a manipulation game be associated
with the rule, and its equilibrium allocations identiﬁed and compared to the
allocations the rule would recommend under truthful behavior. Local condi-
tions for a list of strategies to be an equilibrium of the game of endowment
misrepresentation associated with the Lindahl rule are derived by Thomson
(1979) who also calculates simple examples. The question is addressed in the
case of economies with normal goods by Sertel and Sanver (1999).
6. Other classes of problems. On the basis of this paper and Thomson
(2005), some understanding of the strength of borrowing-proofness is emerg-
ing. A more deﬁnitive assessment will have to wait until other classes of
problems are studied. Economies with indivisible goods, both when these
are the only goods available and when in addition, there is an inﬁnitely di-
visible good that can be used to perform compensations, are investigated
by Atlamaz and Thomson (2007), who report a combination of positive and
negative results. The withholding issue is considered for economies with
indivisible goods by Atlamaz and Klaus (2007).
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